Secure PDF Viewer
by GrapheneOS
Secure PDF viewer with zero permissions required
| App Name | Secure PDF Viewer |
|---|---|
| Developer | GrapheneOS |
| Category | Productivity |
| Download Size | 3 MB |
| Latest Version | 28 |
| Average Rating | 4.38 |
| Rating Count | 581 |
| Google Play | Download |
| AppBrain | Download Secure PDF Viewer Android app |
Simple Android PDF viewer based on pdf.js and content providers. The app doesn't require any permissions. The PDF stream is fed into the sandboxed WebView without giving it access to the network, files, content providers or any other data.
Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the APK assets along with blocking custom fonts since pdf.js handles rendering those itself.
It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with less access than it would have within the browser.
Recent changes:
Notable changes in version 28:
• add back JPEG 2000 image support unintentionally removed in PDF Viewer version 27 due to pdf.js splitting it out
• add JavaScript fallback for JPEG 2000 image support for when the WebView JIT is disabled
• improve CMYK to RGB conversion when the WebView JIT is enabled via ICC profile support provided by the pure Rust qcms library compiled to WebAssembly
See https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases/tag/28 for the full release notes.
Content-Security-Policy is used to enforce that the JavaScript and styling properties within the WebView are entirely static content from the APK assets along with blocking custom fonts since pdf.js handles rendering those itself.
It reuses the hardened Chromium rendering stack while only exposing a tiny subset of the attack surface compared to actual web content. The PDF rendering code itself is memory safe with dynamic code evaluation disabled, and even if an attacker did gain code execution by exploiting the underlying web rendering engine, they're within the Chromium renderer sandbox with less access than it would have within the browser.
Recent changes:
Notable changes in version 28:
• add back JPEG 2000 image support unintentionally removed in PDF Viewer version 27 due to pdf.js splitting it out
• add JavaScript fallback for JPEG 2000 image support for when the WebView JIT is disabled
• improve CMYK to RGB conversion when the WebView JIT is enabled via ICC profile support provided by the pure Rust qcms library compiled to WebAssembly
See https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases/tag/28 for the full release notes.
